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UK energy policy has evolved since the 2002 Energy Review (PIU, 2002) in which Tony 
Blair introduced the report and noted that “securing cheap, reliable, and sustainable sources 
of energy has long been a major concern for governments”. The new Department of Energy 
and Climate Change, DECC, has rephrased its objectives3 to “ensure our energy is secure, 
affordable and efficient” and “bring about a transition to a low-carbon Britain”. The shift 
from “cheap” to “affordable” is significant, as meeting the low-carbon (low-C) targets will 
not be cheap, but should be affordable. We forget that in the interwar period electricity prices 
were three to four times more expensive than now in real terms. Since then dramatic 
improvements in efficiency have allowed costs and prices to fall. If one considers that real 
wages have improved by a factor of four over this period, electricity prices relative to earning 
power are now less than one tenth of their interwar level.  
The target of reducing Greenhouse Gas (GHG) to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050 is 
best achieved by decarbonising electricity, as that is much easier than decarbonising any 
other fuel. At present we consume roughly one third of daily energy needs in transport, one-
third in heating and one third in the primary energy used to produce electricity. Heating can 
be replaced more efficiently through electric powered heat pumps, road transport might be 
replaced by electric vehicles, resulting in an almost entirely carbon free economy (Mackay 
2009). 
Zero-carbon electricity can be generated from a variety of sources, many of which are 
only available in limited local supply and cost substantially more than current fossil fuels. If 
fossil generation paid the full social cost of carbon, nuclear power and much on-shore wind 
power would already be competitive in favoured locations, but carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) and many renewables (biomass, tidal stream, wave power, photovoltaic or PV, and 
even concentrated solar thermal power) would still not be commercially competitive, 
particularly at commercial interest rates. 
The case for renewable electricity supply (RES) is that it may be more suitable for 
many developing countries than other low-C options, particularly nuclear power with its 
proliferation risks, high skill requirements and minimum economic scale. If RES is to be 
more widely deployed their costs must be driven down through research, development, and 
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deployment (RD&D, including learning-by-doing). Supporting RES is therefore justified not 
by the carbon saved (which should be addressed through carbon pricing) but through the 
induced innovation and learning-by-doing that deployment might deliver. The case for EU-
wide RES targets is simply as an equitable burden-sharing arrangement to provide the public 
good of this RD&D. 
The Committee on Climate Change (CCC) reported in 2008, also arguing that 
decarbonising electricity was the key to meeting the 2030 carbon targets, which require 
electricity to have an average CO2 (carbon-dioxide) intensity of about 70g/kWh compared to 
the present figure of over 550g/kWh. Given the durability of power plant, that implies that 
essentially everything now built must be zero or very low-C generation. CCC (2008) argued 
that nuclear power was cost-competitive and the economic case was strong given a 
significant carbon price and future expected high fuel prices, although delivery would be 
constrained on the supply side (because of possible shortages of finance, engineers, and 
companies with access the relevant technologies). Their forecast was for a central case CO2 
price of €50/EUA in 2020,4 based on the assumption that the carbon price would be set by the 
trade-off between coal and gas-fired generation.  
EUA price 25 October 2004-27 September 2009
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Oct-
04
Dec-
04
Apr-
05
Jul-
05
Sep-
05
Dec-
05
Mar-
06
Jun-
06
Sep-
06
Dec-
06
Mar-
07
Jun-
07
Sep-
07
Dec-
07
Mar-
08
Jun-
08
Sep-
08
Dec-
08
Mar-
09
Jun-
09
Sep-
09
E
ur
o/
t C
O
2
Futures Dec 2007
OTC Index
Second period Dec 2008
Second period Dec 2009
CER 09
start of ETS
Second period
 
Figure 1 The EU price of CO2 
 
Figure 1 shows that although the EUA price reached over €30/EUA in June 2008, it 
then fell to less than half that level during 2009, and CCC (2009) now forecasts €20/EUA for 
2020, which is too low for commercial investment in low-C generation. The implication is 
that policy intervention is required to raise the forecast minimum price of CO2, either through 
tightening the ETS cap or through other support mechanisms such as contracts for differences 
                                                 
4  The EUA is the EU allowance price for 1 tonne of CO2 set by the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). 
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or a supplementary carbon tax. The former would be fiscally costly, while the latter could be 
fiscally positive but might be consider illegal by the CEC as discriminatory without a suitable 
(and desirable) EU-wide agreement. There are precedents for an EU-wide agreement on taxes 
– for example the minimum levels for various oil products – and in any case member states 
are free to set excise taxes as they choose, although without EU-wide harmonisation there 
would be problems of leakage. The production of carbon-intensive products might migrate to 
the lowest carbon cost country, although it might be possible to exempt export-exposed 
products or industries from the supplementary carbon tax.5  
In Britain one possible approach would be to reform the Climate Change Levy (CCL) 
into a Carbon Correction Levy (also CCL) that would be extended to the whole economy and 
levied on the carbon content of fuel. It could start at the current CCL level and escalate 
annually so that by the commissioning date of large new zero-carbon generation it had 
reached an acceptable level. Industries in the sector covered by the EU ETS would then claim 
back the value of the EUAs submitted, ensuring that everyone in the economy faced the same 
effective carbon price. It would admittedly be challenging to find a way of rebating or 
protecting the trade-exposed sectors, although the Scandinavian countries managed this with 
varying success when they imposed carbon taxes, and in the UK diesel fuel used in 
agricultural machinery and fishing boats is exempt from the normal excise tax. 
CCC (2009) noted that emissions had fallen over the period 2003-7 by less than 1% 
p.a. and needed to fall by between 2% and 3% p.a., depending on the targets agreed at 
Copenhagen. The recession was masking the poor performance of cutting emissions and also 
undermining the EU emissions trading system (ETS). The CCC report also noted the need to 
review electricity market arrangements and the mechanism for supporting renewables, which 
amplifies risk, increasing the cost of support and reduces incentives for speedy deployment. 
The recent gyrations in the EUA market underline the uncertainty about the future CO2 price. 
The earlier target of CO2 intensity in electricity for a fully efficient market has now risen to 
about 120g CO2/kWh in 2030, but the report notes that in a world of uncertainty and myopia 
the intensity may exceed 200g CO2/kWh, undermining the route to a low-C market. Figure 2 
puts these figures into perspective, and shows that France reduced emissions from over 500 g 
CO2/kWh in 1974 to 100 g CO2/kWh by 1987. In contrast the current UK level is 540 g 
CO2/kWh and the target for 2020 is now only 300 g CO2/kWh (CCC, 2009).  
Mackay (2009) argues that any plan to decarbonise the economy must “add up” and 
identify the sources of electricity supply to meet the 2050 target of 70 kWh/day/person. Of 
the five plans that he illustrates, three of them propose a relatively modest role for nuclear 
power and instead propose considerable quantities of solar power delivered from North 
African deserts. The “ economic” plan E suggests that 44 out of the 70 kWh should come 
from nuclear power. The other plan D “diversity” suggests 16 kWh from nuclear, and a 
similar amount from clean coal with wind supplying 8 kWh and the remainder from a variety 
of sources. (In all these scenarios heat pumps supply 12 kWh “free” as a contribution to the 
70 kWh, being the surplus from displacing inefficient heat raising sources – an efficient heat 
                                                 
5  The French government had hoped to introduce a carbon tax in July 2010, but it was apparently opposed by 
the Constitutional Court because too many categories of taxpayers were exempted. 
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pump can produce four times the amount of heating than the energy content of the electricity 
used to power it.) 
CO2 emissions per kWh 1971-2000
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Figure 2 Electricity emissions intensity 1971-2000 
Source: IEA (2002) 
 
The UK options for delivering low-C electricity appear limited with the exception of 
nuclear power: hydro-electricity is limited, wave/tidal energy is too costly, biomass for 
electricity generation is an inefficient use compared with heat raising and requires a huge 
land-take,6 CCS is expensive as is solar photovoltaic, leaving onshore wind which is almost 
competitive at present prices but faces challenges in visual acceptability and transmission 
connection. Offshore wind is costly, and so the concentrated power in North Africa appears a 
long way off. 
 
The Case for Nuclear Power 
The government has also changed its stance since the 2002 Energy Review on the case for 
nuclear power. The White Paper on Nuclear Power (BERR, 2008)7 now accepts “that nuclear 
power is low carbon, affordable, dependable, safe and capable of increasing diversity of 
energy supply.” DECC (2009). Unfortunately, over the next decade instead of increasing its 
share of generation and helping reduce carbon intensity, British nuclear power will gradually 
fade away and unless new build is commissioned soon, we shall be left with just one station 
in the 2020s. Figure 2 makes clear what a major contribution nuclear power made to 
                                                 
6 Running Britain’s largest coal-fired station, Drax, on base load with biomass would require all the land in a 
disc round the station planted to biomass with a diameter of 164km, while wind farms to displace Drax would 
take up 1,750 km2, (a circle of diameter 47km) although the land beneath could still be used for agriculture. 
7 http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file43006.pdf 
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decarbonising French electricity, and had we started commissioning stations in 2002, instead 
of gradually putting the necessary regulatory apparatus in place from 2010, we might have 
been better placed to achieve impressive results by 2020, instead of observing the gradual fall 
in expectations between CCC (2008) and CCC (2009). 
Nuclear power can deliver zero-C electricity in bulk, reliably and without 
intermittency, it has a very small land take in contrast to renewables, and the first set of sites 
and their communities are ready and willing to accept new investment. Although capital costs 
have risen substantially since 2005, so have those of most capital-intensive generation 
options, so that nuclear power still appears to be the least costly of large-scale zero-C 
alternatives, particularly at low discount rates.8 The main drawback is that the time to build is 
lengthy and uncertain, so the CCC contemplates stations only starting to arrive in 2018, 
followed thereafter at 18-month intervals. 
Nevertheless, nuclear investment faces a number of risks: 
 
• The Integrated Planning Committee may not deliver approvals in time; 
• The waste-disposal problem may not be resolved satisfactorily; 
• The regulatory framework for nuclear power may be taken to judicial review; 
• The supply chain maybe insufficient to meet the UK and other demands; 
• There may be insufficient trained personnel to construct and operate the plant; 
• Finally, there may be problems financing the investment given the uncertainty 
about the future carbon price. 
 
France demonstrated how rapidly the carbon intensity of electricity can be reduced, as 
figure 2 shows. Following the oil crisis of the 1970s, France embarked on a major investment 
programme, as figure 3 shows.  
Between 1975 and 1990 France installed 50 GW of nuclear capacity at an annual rate 
reaching nearly 5,000 MW, comparable to the best that the United States did during this 
period. In contrast the UK constructed only 7 GW between 1975 and 1990. If we contrast this 
with the rate at which wind capacity has been built in the leading countries, Germany and 
Spain have added effective capacity (allowing for the relatively low load factor of 25%) at 
rates less than 400 MW effective per year, or about 10% of the rate at which France installed 
nuclear capacity. By 2008, Germany had the equivalent of three nuclear power stations in 
installed wind capacity, with Spain somewhat behind and the UK at 1 GW or just over one-
half a single nuclear power station. 
                                                 
8  Estimates and comparisons of costs are not simple, as Roques et al (2006, 2008) show. SKM (2008) gives 
rather optimistic levellised costs in 2020 at £38/MWh assuming a CO2 price of €30/EUA, gas at 55p/therm and 
coal at $110/tonne, when on-shore wind would be £60/MWh, offshore wind £85/MWh and both coal and gas 
more expensive than nuclear power. CCC (2009, fig 4.36) shows nuclear profitable if any of the following 
parameters are more favourable than: cost of capital 8%, construction cost £2,500/kW, capacity factor 77%, 
EUA price lifetime (40 years) average €98 and gas at 50p/th. The source, Redpoint (2009) assumes the EUA 
price to rise from €40 to €120 between 2020 and 2030 and presumably further thereafter. Recent estimates for 
the EPR costs at Olkilouto and Flamanville are respectively €3,000/kW and €2,500/kW (Leveque, 2009), 
although these must be considered first-of-a-kind costs. 
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Figure 3 Average annual rate (five year averages) of nuclear build 1975-2005 
Source: OECD Net Maximum Electrical Capacity, Paris OECD 
 
Nuclear power in liberalised markets 
Although clearly nuclear power can decarbonise the electricity sector over a relatively short 
time horizon once commissioning starts, in the past this has been undertaken by state-owned 
companies or regulated utilities able to recover the costs from their customers. In today’s 
liberalised electricity markets, nuclear investments would have to be undertaken by private 
companies taking a commercial view about the risks involved. These are considerable. The 
price of electricity in the forward market moves very closely with the cost of generating using 
either gas or coal, allowing for the cost of CO2 required for each, as figure 4 demonstrates. 
Although the prices of gas, coal, CO2 and electricity are separately highly volatile, (gas prices 
have fluctuated between 20p/th and 110p/th and coal has fluctuated from $50-200/ton 
between 2004-8) the forward clean spark spread and the forward dark green spread have 
remained far more stable.9 The reason is simple, the price of electricity is set by the cost of 
generating using the marginal fuel and the CO2 price moves to equate the marginal costs 
(including the EUA cost) of coal and gas. Companies with fossil generation are therefore 
naturally hedged against fluctuations in the input and output prices, while low-C electricity, 
whether renewables or nuclear, is exposed to the full volatility of the electricity price, as its 
variable costs are low, predictable and stable. 
  
                                                 
9  The clean spark spread is the price of electricity less the gas and EUA cost in a CCGT, while the dark green 
spread is the price of electricity less the coal and EUA cost in a coal-fired station. The measure the gross profit 
margin needed to cover the capital cost. 
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Figure 4 2010 Forward prices of UK electricity and the gas and coal costs, 2007-9 
Source: Bloomberg data 
 
Worse still, to the extent that the electricity sectors in the EU meet their carbon and 
RES targets, the demand for EUAs and even fossil fuels might fall to the extent that their 
prices and hence the marginal cost of electricity fell to levels that would be uneconomic. The 
steeper the marginal abatement curve, and the greater the uncertainty about the amount of 
targeted and/or supported other low-C electricity (RES, CCS), the greater the uncertainty in 
the future EUA price. We currently face a future in which gas-fired generators fear high gas 
and carbon prices but low load factors if wind is moderately successful, and low-C investors 
fear the opposite, favouring portfolio generation companies but disadvantaging those with 
specialised skills in low-C investment. 
Consumers would prefer stable electricity prices, and should therefore be willing to 
sign contracts with those who can deliver such stable prices. The new Finnish nuclear plant 
Olkiluoto 3 has long-term off-take contracts with major electricity consumers, who benefit 
from this stability, but British domestic consumers are unlikely to want to sign long-term 
power contracts with electricity companies. One natural alternative is for nuclear power 
companies to issue bonds each paying the domestic price of 1 kWh of electricity each year.10 
That would enable a consumer to hedge the risk of fluctuating electricity bills by holding 
these bonds, and at current real long-term bond interest rates, even allowing for company 
bond risk, the cost of financing nuclear power stations would appear to be modest. Provided 
                                                 
10  One way of determining the dividend would be to index it to the annual cost of 3,300 kWh for domestic 
customers averaged over the country, but correcting for any non-carbon taxes (such as VAT, the current CCL, 
and other impositions such as energy efficiency levies), using the methodology published in DECC Quarterly 
Energy Prices. 
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the equipment suppliers and constructors could guarantee costs, merchant nuclear power 
investment financed in this way would appear economically attractive.  
 
Consequence of the 2020 Renewables Target 
SKM (2008) estimated in its mid scenario that to meet the UK’s renewable energy target, 
40% of total electricity, or 150 TWh, would need to come from renewable sources. This 
would require 38 GW from wind, giving a total installed capacity of 110 GW with the 56 GW 
of conventional generation running at only a 31% load factor to meet a peak demand of some 
65 GW. The investment cost of the RES would be £60 billion with an additional £10 billion 
for grid expansion compared, with £12 billion spent on non-renewables, of which just under 
£4 billion would be nuclear power. The implied cost per tonne of CO2 saved would be 
€95/tonne to be contrasted with the present EUA price of less than €15/tonne and CCC’s 
more optimistic 2008 forecast of €50/EUA. CCC (2009) has scaled these figures down to 27 
GW of wind and 7 GW of other RES by 2022, delivering 106 TWh (35% of the total). 
Is the implied rate of building wind power plausible, and if so, what impact might it 
have on market prices and risks facing nuclear investment? The CCC target of 23 GW new 
wind capacity by 2020 requires an average of 2 GW per year, which Germany has 
comfortably exceeded since 2002 and Spain since 2007, as figure 5 shows.  
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Figure 5 Installed wind nameplate capacity 1995-2008 
Source: OECD Net Maximum Electrical Capacity, Paris OECD; BWEA 
 
Clearly, if planning constraints can be overcome and the transmission delivered, the 
planned objectives are feasible, at least if built onshore. The implications of this amount of 
wind generation ought to be much greater price volatility with apparently a significant 
number of hours with a zero or even negative spot price as wind is spilled. This would require 
a corresponding number of hours of very high prices to deliver the necessary production 
weighted average price to cover the full costs of new investment required.  
UK’s target: 27,000 
MW by 2020 
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CCC (2009) is more optimistic than earlier simulations, suggesting that even by 2030 
wind power would exceed total demand less than 2% of the time, and by 2020 substantially 
less than one tenth of 1% of the time. Pöyry (2009) simulated the output duration curve for 40 
GW of wind in Britain and found considerable annual variations (13%) and the impact on 
residual demand of subtracting wind output from the (partially correlated) demand duration 
curve, giving the amount to be supplied by other stations, and showing some 5% of hours of 
excess supply (but this is very non-linear in the wind capacity, explaining the low spill 
fraction under the CCC’s 2020 target of 27 GW wind).  
Denmark, with some 25% wind but the option of exporting surplus power, already has 
negative prices for many hours per year, to the point that owners of CHP plant now find it 
periodically profitable to replace gas in heat raising and power generation with using 
electricity to provide the hot water without generating any power. Building more 
interconnectors to the Continent and especially Norway, with its storage hydro, may become 
very attractive and mitigate some of the excess supply zero-price periods. 
Perhaps the more serious issue is that intermittent generation requires considerably 
larger reserves. Pöyry (2009) found that there were 209 hours in the period 2000-7 with zero 
wind output, although only one period of 3 days of zero wind. In such periods either demand 
would need to be scaled back, perhaps dramatically, or considerable conventional reserve 
capacity would be needed that must be paid to remain on the system. Pöyry estimated reserve 
requirements of 9 GW in 2020 and over 10 GW in 2030. The problem is made worse by 
increasing fractions of nuclear power, which it is considerably more expensive to operate in 
flexible mode (Pouret et al, 2009). 
Paying for reserves could be either through capacity payments, contracts, or periodic 
very high price spikes. Capacity payments under the former electricity Pool were paid on the 
value of lost load (£2,000/MWh in 1990) times the loss of load probability, but this was both 
unpredictable and very volatile. A cheaper alternative might be for the System Operator (SO) 
to contract sufficiently far ahead to secure such reserves at a reasonable cost, but this would 
require changing the incentives on the SO and changing the regulatory system of rewarding 
these functions. Failing that, the necessary volatility in the spot price might induce suppliers 
to contract for availability in capacity without additional encouragement, but this risks the 
necessary contracts not being in place until too late to secure the required reserves. Certainly 
Ofgem in its Project Discovery (Ofgem, 2009a) is concerned that the proportion of plant that 
is flexible will fall from nearly 60 GW in 2009 to about 40 GW in 2020, at a time when 
flexible plant will be even more necessary. 
Even if this problem is adequately addressed, there remains the question whether 
transmission investment will be adequate, timely, and efficiently used. Ofgem (2009a) argues 
that there is a strong case for building offshore links along the west coast of Britain and 
reinforcing north/south links between Scotland and England, presumably because of the 
difficulty of securing planning consent to build more cheaply on-shore, and strengthening the 
grid in East Anglia and Wales. They propose further offshore cables from northeast Scotland 
to the north east of England at a later date and under some scenarios these could be used to 
interconnect with offshore wind farms and the Continent – again costly solutions. 
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The current GB transmission access arrangements appear quite unsuitable for massive 
wind generation. At present generators seeking connection must wait until reinforcements are 
in place to allow firm (i.e. base load) access to the grid – “invest then connect”. Such 
reinforcements would be excessive for wind capacity with an availability of less than 30%, as 
demand will not increase much but capacity is expected to increase by nearly 50%. The 
present arrangements would impose excessive delays in connecting wind farms, and provide 
excessive capacity. An interim solution of “connect and manage” would require the 
Transmission System Operator (TSO) to use contracts and the balancing mechanism to 
manage congestion while recovering the costs from consumers. This would provide weak 
incentives to generators to manage their output unless the TSO were incentivised to offer 
appropriate contracts, and would surely be a costly solution for dealing with Scottish 
congestion. Constraint costs arising from “Scottish Actions” (i.e. dealing with the constraints 
arising from exporting from Scotland) rose from £42 million in 2007/8 to £231 m in 2008/9 
and are forecast by NGET to rise to £290 m in 2010/11 (Ofgem, 2009b). There is previous 
experience of the cost of poor incentives to manage congestion costs – in the four years after 
privatisation total constraint costs in England and Wales doubled to £509 m per year, before 
eventually falling to £37 m in 1997/8 and then to £12 m/year in 2001/2 – in 2008/9 the 
constraints in England and Wales were still only £30 m so Scotland is now driving the GB 
total costs. Frontier Economics (2009) estimates that “connect and manage” could increase 
congestion costs by between £1.9 bn and £3.5 bn in net present costs up to 2020 compared 
with the old system of “invest then connect”. 
Nor are current balancing arrangements satisfactory as the day-ahead market is ill 
suited for contracting intermittent wind generation, particularly as wind forecasts become 
increasingly accurate down to about 4 hours before despatch. At present the dual price system 
is narrow, illiquid, very volatile, and penalises those who have not fully contracted their 
output well-before gate-closure (1 hour before dispatch).11 Balancing costs are also high 
compared to recent constraint costs – estimated to be £366 m for 2009/10 but rising to £525 
m for 2011/12, and that is before there is substantial new wind generation (Ofgem, 2009b). 
Timely wind forecasts should allow more efficient despatch of fossil generation, allowing 
more time for ramping and cold-starts, but this would be more economically achieved with 
central despatch rather than the present system of self-despatch. 
 
The Argument for Change 
If the present system of access and balancing is flawed and inefficient, then an economist 
would argue that it ought to be possible to make everyone better off by improving the system. 
The challenge is to identify the efficient long-run solution that can co-exist with an evolving 
regime for incumbent generators, and then only offer that new regime to all new connections. 
To avoid litigation it should compensate incumbents for any change while encouraging them 
to migrate to the new access regime. The efficient long-run solution is nodal pricing (or 
locational marginal pricing) with central despatch where nodal pricing reflects both 
                                                 
11  Newbery (2005, 2009) 
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congestion and marginal losses at each grid connection point (Brunekreeft et al 2005) . It has 
the advantage that it reduces prices in export-constrained zones and thus encourages efficient 
investment location for generation and also providing price signals for expanding the grid. 
Central despatch enables both efficient scheduling and balancing as a single coordinated 
activity. Until recently, such a system would have been criticised as an academic utopian 
exercise, but first New Zealand and then PJM12 in the US have demonstrated that it can work, 
in the latter case on a system several times as large as the UK. The lesson has been learned, 
and New York, New England, California and Texas have either introduced the system or are 
planning to do so shortly. 
The obvious objections to nodal pricing are that it would appear to disadvantage 
Scottish generators (although by lowering Scottish wholesale prices it would benefit Scottish 
consumers) and would produce large shifts in revenue between Scottish and more southerly 
generators for relatively small efficiency gains. These objections have been successful in 
previous UK litigation and suggest strongly the importance of compensating any losers 
before such a change is made. It is worth remembering that the transition from the CEGB to a 
liberalised market was carefully designed with contracts to manage the transition so that large 
industrial consumers, coal miners, and the generating companies were insulated against any 
unforeseen price changes or price volatility in the wholesale market. That lesson appears to 
have been lost, and Ofgem has been reluctant to propose contractual transition solutions to 
overcome the inefficiencies in the transmission access regime.  
Again, the US provides evidence that such contracts can be designed. Existing 
generators would receive long-term transmission contracts that had a strike price equal to 
their current Transmission Entry Capacity (TEC) charges, but would allow them to sell 
additional power at the locational marginal price (LMP) or to receive the difference between 
the contract price and the LMP if they sold less. This would leave generators significantly 
better off than at present and would appear to leave no transmission rights for intermittent 
generation other than those secured in the stock market. The challenge would therefore be to 
devise contracts that reduced these excess incumbent rents, ensuring that they were still 
attractive, while facilitating the entry of wind as it were built. Fortunately, the TEC charges 
can be revised annually subject to the regulated total revenue for the TSO, National Grid, and 
it should be possible therefore to devise an evolution of these charges that would encourage 
incumbents to reduce the TEC they claimed, releasing capacity for wind, and with careful 
design reducing the excess rents. 
 
Financing Low-Carbon Electricity 
Delivering low-C electricity at least cost will require an adequate, credible and durable CO2 
price for mature technologies, and a minimally distorting form of support for potential future 
low-C technologies. Neither of these is assured at present. CCC (2009) recommended that the 
climate change levy should be exempted for all low-C generation (not just renewables and 
“good” CHP) if it is to be a genuine climate change levy and not an electricity tax. The CO2 
                                                 
12  The Pennsylvania-New Jersey Maryland interconnection, although now much wider than its original 
geographic area. 
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price needs to be supported at an adequate level, which should increase steadily over time as 
we approach the date at which the costs of climate change become more appreciable. 
Investment uncertainty would be reduced by feed-in tariffs (FITs) for new low-C generation, 
phasing out the existing Renewable Obligation Certificate (ROC) support system.13  
The difficulty with FITs is the risk that the tariff will be either set too high, producing 
excess rents and high consumer prices, or too low, risking undersupply. For mature 
technologies such as wind it should be possible to calculate acceptable FITs and the German 
experience suggests that this is correct. For less mature technologies like PV, the evidence is 
that FITs have been set too high in Spain, Germany and the UK, leading to excess demand, 
inflated prices, exhausting the funds prematurely and leading to a collapse in the nascent PV 
supply industry. That suggests using tender auctions in which bidders would offer 
combinations of a subsidy per kW capacity when available and per kWh generated, with 
penalties to ensure credible bids, allowing the auction office to select the least-cost options.14 
The alternative of placing low-C obligations on suppliers might lead to innovative 
mechanisms, but runs into the problem that consumers can switch suppliers at short notice, 
raising risk and hence cost. 
All of these mechanisms for supporting low-C electricity tend to bypass the market, 
except for the discredited ROC scheme. There is a danger that if a large fraction of generation 
is intermittent, or inflexible (like nuclear),15 or operating with long-term contracts to deliver 
adequate reserves, the market will fail to deliver its intended advantages. 
 
Reforming the market design 
If, as many believe, the present market design is not well suited to massive renewables, then 
it is worth setting out the criteria that any reformed market should meet. Liberalised markets 
have been justified for producing more efficient outcomes than regulated markets, for which 
they need to encourage competition, and that means potential entry. The major gains are to be 
had from improved investment delivery, so the market should provide incentives for timely, 
efficient (by location and technology) and adequate investment in generation and 
transmission, reflecting the comparative advantage that each country and location has in 
delivering appropriate low-C generation. Clearly, the market needs to reflect the social cost 
of carbon, support RD&D without distortions, ensure that the existing plant is efficiently 
despatched and that the final price is affordable to consumers. Given that the carbon price is 
                                                 
13 See Mitchell and Connor (2005) for a cogent critique of UK support for renewable energy. 
14  The Non-fossil fuel obligation (NFFO), put in place by the Electricity Act 1989 and continued until replaced 
by the Renewables Obligation, collected funds from a levy or tax on fossil-generated electricity. Originally 
primarily designed to raise funds for covering nuclear fuel liabilities, some part of the revenue was used to run 
tender auctions for renewables, with an impressive fall in the FIT prices paid in successive rounds (see 
http://www.nfpa.co.uk/index.html). Only a modest fraction of wind projects that were accepted were actually 
built, suggesting that the costs of tendering were too low to develop credible projects – and hence some 
commitment to delivery might be desirable, although more research is clearly needed to improve the 
procurement of RES.  
15  Whether nuclear power is flexible or not depends on its type and economics – see Pouret et al (2009). E.On’s 
operational experience suggests PWRs can be capable of responding to wind variations (Micklinghoff, 2007). 
Nuclear future?  David Newbery 
Papers\Nuclear IEA 30/03/2010 13
both too low and too unpredictable, and that the UK’s RES support through ROCs is costly 
and inefficient, the country faces essentially two alternatives.  
One is to abandon the liberalised market and move to a single buyer model in which 
the single buyer, probably the TSO, contracts for the portfolio of low-C generation by 
location to minimise the total cost of transmission and generation. This would restore some of 
the synergies of the old pre-liberalised CEGB, but might, if tendering for contracts were 
competitive, avoid the inefficiencies. It could overcome the risks and costs facing nuclear 
power where the electricity price is both too volatile and possibly thought to be too low 
because of uncertainties about the CO2 price, providing the single buyer were mandated to 
achieve the carbon and RES targets and allowed to charge consumers accordingly. The 
obvious problem is that the single buyer would be a monopoly and in need of regulation, 
which would be challenging as it would combine elements of natural monopoly – where to 
locate transmission and generation, and markets – how to balance the different dimensions of 
the bids in the tender auctions. 
The alternative is to reform the market to meet some of the drawbacks of the current 
design. As argued above, this would involve a shift to nodal pricing with central despatch and 
the SO given a longer time horizon (4 plus years) to contract for balancing and reserve 
services. ROCs for future RES. would be replaced by a FIT paying a capacity payment for 
availability and an energy payment if despatched, related to the variable costs, which for 
wind would primarily be the extra short-run balancing costs. That should avoid wind bidding 
negative prices and disrupting the spot market and should provide greater investment 
assurance for new RES.  
SKM (2008) estimated that the cost of supporting renewables could be between £60-
90 per household or £5.2-7.8 billion per year. Instead of passing the extra costs of supporting 
RES through to final consumers, the RD&D element could be financed from a carbon tax 
and/or charging the full rate of VAT on energy. Raising the rate of VAT from 5% to 17.5% 
would raise about £3 billion extra per year, while raising the CO2 price from £10/EUA to 
£25/EUA by a CO2 tax of £15/tonne for electricity would raise £2.75 billion per year at 
current electricity emissions intensity, and taxing final gas consumption would raise a further 
£1.5 billion; altogether £7.3 billion per year or close to the likely extra cost. Of course as the 
carbon intensity of electricity fell that element of revenue would decrease, but over time the 
carbon price should rise, and depending on the shortfall between the EUA price and social 
cost of carbon, revenue might rise or fall from this estimated amount. 
The argument for transferring RD&D support from electricity to general taxation is 
simple - taxes on single products are more distorting than taxes on a wider tax base, and 
removing an artificial distortion (the reduced VAT rate on energy amounts to an energy 
subsidy to final consumption) reduces the dead weight cost of taxation. RD&D is a public 
good benefiting ultimately the planet and indirectly future UK residents, and should not 
therefore be charged to current consumers, particularly as electricity is a price and income 
inelastic service and therefore would fall more heavily on the poor (which is the justification 
for the lower VAT, although not a sound one). 
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Conclusions 
Nuclear power offers one of the most credible large-scale sources of zero-C electricity, 
although given past Government delays there will now be a lengthy period before the nuclear 
supply industry can ramp up to deliver the required rates of investment previously seen in the 
1980s. Even if that can be achieved, the present liberalised market is poorly designed to 
encourage nuclear and other low-C investment without an adequate carbon price. The 
situation is likely to be made more difficult if Britain is to reach its RES 2020 target, as this 
will require substantial wind, which will cause considerable volatility in market prices and 
significant periods of very low prices under the present market design, not to mention a 
lowering of the EUA and possibly gas prices. That further justifies a major reform of the 
electricity market design or its replacement by a single buyer model and better underwriting 
of the carbon price.  
Current renewable support can be justified by the learning benefits to the extent that 
the technology could become commercially viable in other countries. The present 2020 
targets for the EU have the benefits of sharing the burden of providing the public good of 
RD&D, but fail to insure that each country invests in the technology with the best long-term 
prospects suited to the country’s resources, rather than choosing the current least-cost option. 
Transmission access arrangements will need significant modification to handle massive 
renewable generation, and will need careful transition arrangements to prevent litigation in a 
privately owned generation market. Current support in the UK for RES is both risky and 
costly and requires a shift to long-term contracting, which threatens the liberalised market 
unless we move back to something like the pool with nodal pricing. 
Supporting the carbon price should ideally be done at the EU level, and as between 
the alternatives for the UK of offering contracts for differences on the carbon price or 
imposing an additional carbon tax on fossil generation, the latter is fiscally preferable to the 
former and although it would raise the cost of electricity to electricity-intensive industries, it 
would not cause any relocation of generation abroad. It might be necessary to provide 
countervailing subsidies to electricity-intensive industries to prevent them moving off-shore, 
or exemptions from the carbon tax, as was done in Scandinavia when the carbon tax was 
introduced there, but this would need careful design to avoid excessive subsidy or 
comparatively disadvantageous industries and to avoid conflicts with EU legislation. 
Provided the future carbon price is underwritten at a sufficiently high level, nuclear power 
would seem viable in a liberalised market without long term off-take contracts, particularly if 
nuclear generating companies issued electricity-indexed bonds to consumers to reduce the 
cost of capital. 
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